On 4 November 2026 the Court of Appeal dismissed the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s appeal in R (AAM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 1411. The Court held that kidnapping a person and subjecting them to force or threats in order to extract a ransom from their family may, depending on the facts, amount to “exploitation” within the statutory definition of a victim of human trafficking.
AAM, a Syrian national, fled to Libya under threat of conscription. He was abducted and held captive for one month, and was beaten and deprived of adequate food. He was forced to contact his family to relay ransom demands, and was released after a ransom was paid. He then travelled to the United Kingdom, where his case was referred to the National Referral Mechanism, the process by which potential victims of slavery and trafficking are identified. The Secretary of State decided that there were no reasonable grounds for suspecting that AAM was a victim of slavery or trafficking, on the basis that no exploitation had taken place, as he had not been required to perform work or provide services to his captors in Libya.
AAM sought Judicial Review of that decision. The Judge held that the Secretary of State had taken too narrow an approach to exploitation, and had erred by failing to consider whether, on the facts of the particular case, AAM had been exploited. The decision was quashed, and remitted to the Secretary of State. On appeal, the Secretary of State argued that kidnap for ransom fell outside the forms of exploitation the UK was obliged to recognise under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (ECAT) and the Palermo Protocol.
The Court of Appeal rejected that argument and upheld the decision of the High Court. Giving the lead judgment, Lewis LJ held that Article 4 of ECAT sets a minimum which states are free to exceed, and that the question turns on the words of regulation 3 of the Slavery and Human Trafficking (Definition of Victim) Regulations 2022. On a natural reading of regulation 3(6)(d)(iii), a kidnapped person subjected to force or threats designed to induce them to enable their captor to acquire a benefit, such as a ransom, may be “exploited” within the statutory definition. The Secretary of State had therefore erred in failing to consider whether AAM’s kidnapping amounted to exploitation.
Samantha Knights KC acted for AAM, instructed by Duncan Lewis.
The judgment can be found here.