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Ahmed v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2 and [2010] UKSC 5

14/01/2026

Written by: Zoe Brereton 

Background 

Ahmed v HM Treasury concerned a challenge to the validity of two Orders in Council — the Terrorism Order and the Al-Qaida Order —implementing the UK’s international obligations to freeze the assets of those involved in terrorism.  

Both Orders were made by the Treasury without any Parliamentary scrutiny. They allowed the Treasury to freeze assets where (under the Terrorism Order) there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that a person was involved in terrorism, or (under Art 3(1)(b) of the Al-Qaida Order) an individual was on the UN sanctions committee’s list. 

The Orders were draconian in their effect. In two of the three cases before the Supreme Court, orders had been made against UK citizens who had never been charged or arrested for terrorism related offences. The Orders had placed an extraordinary burden on their families, created significant mental health difficulties, and led to breakdown of their marriages. Designated persons were “effectively prisoners of the state”: [4]. 

The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the Orders were ultra vires s 1(1) of the United Nations Act 1946, which empowers Security Council Resolutions (“SCRs”) to be implemented by Order in Council where “necessary or expedient…”. For the Terrorism Order, the question was whether the “reasonable grounds” test exceeded the scope of the SCR which was directed at those “who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts”. For the Al-Qaida Order, the question was whether the 1946 Act allowed delegated legislation to interfere with common law rights without providing any judicial recourse to test the premise of the restriction.  

Decision  

In five separate judgments, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Terrorism Order was ultra vires. A majority of the Court equally struck down Art 3(1)(b) of the Al-Qaida Order. 

For a majority of the Court, the Terrorism Order was invalid because the “reasonable suspicion” test was neither necessary nor expedient to implement the SCR. While casting a wide net made it easier to catch criminals, the principle of legality – that is, the principle that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words – permitted no more interference with basic rights than was necessary and unavoidable to give effect to the SCR.  

The principle of legality was also central to the invalidity of Art 3(1)(b) of the Al-Qaida Order: the common law rights to property and access to the courts meant that s 1 of the 1946 Act contained an implied limitation that restrictions on those rights should be subject to judicial review. As an individual could not seek judicial review of the UN sanctions committee’s decision to list them, the Al-Qaida Order denied them their constitutional right to an effective remedy.  

Comment 

Perhaps influenced by the sense of occasion – Ahmed being the first appeal heard in the Supreme Court after the abolition of the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords – or perhaps simply because of the gross invasions of rights occasioned by the Orders, the judges were plainly, deeply conscious of the importance of their decision. Indeed, Lord Hope recalled “Lord Atkin’s famously powerful protest in Liversidge v Anderson”: [6]. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Ahmed has enduring relevance on matters of high constitutional principle. 

First, Ahmed continues to be relied upon for its assertion of the primacy of Parliament even – and perhaps especially – in times of threats to international security and peace. Each of the judges questioned the legitimacy of introducing restrictive measures by executive order instead of by primary legislation. Such matters “should not pass unnoticed in the democratic process” (Lord Rodger, [186]). 

Secondly, the case reinforced the power of the common law to police executive excess, including by ensuring the right to an effective remedy, in circumstances where European Convention rights had been rendered impotent by their subordinate status to the UN Charter in international law.  

Thirdly, the judgment’s epilogue ([2010] UKSC 5), wherein the Court considered whether it could temporarily suspend the operation of its orders, brought to the fore competing strands of the rule of law. On the one hand (as held by Lord Phillips), such suspension would obfuscate the meaning of its orders, which had been to declare the position in law – the orders having been void ab initio – and not to alter it. On the other hand (per Lord Hope’s dissent), suspending the orders would avoid the UK being in breach of international law and the seismic knock-on effects of banks releasing an uncertain amount of funds before Parliament could act: “There is everything to be said for not letting the cat – whose dimensions and capacity to inflict damage we can only guess at – out of the bag”: [22]. Mr Husain suggested a third, principled reason to suspend: namely, for there to be a “proper opportunity for Parliamentary scrutiny of any replacement provisions”. Given that the absence of Parliamentary scrutiny was central to the Court’s reasons, the Court missed an opportunity to grapple with the fact that the use of emergency legislation to implement draconian powers would be the consequence of its refusal to suspend the operation of its orders.   

Matrix members 

  • Raza Husain KC and Dan Squires KC appeared for the claimant in the third case